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NORTH AMERICAN REVIEW

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ARE WE LOSING THE WAR?

NO! BUT WE HAVE FAR TO GO

BY THE EDITOR

HISTORY will record as a noteworthy incident that Colonel Edward Mandell House was striving earnestly to bound Serbia on the three sides which still possess boundaries when the telephone bell rang and he was notified by Secretary Tumulty, with whom he is once more on speaking terms, at long distance, that forthwith he was to doff the garments of peace and don the panoply of war. Although the abrupt transformation was not wholly unwelcome to one of martial instincts and training, even the temporary abandonment of his great task of Gathering Data upon a scale of comprehensiveness hardly suspected by the American public drew from the Assistant President a sigh of regret. But, in one respect like General Wood, Colonel House is a soldier and goes perforce and uncomplainingly where he is sent. Indeed, as he remarked with characteristic simplicity upon his happily safe arrival in London, he was not merely willing but "glad to take either rôle in the interest of my country." Fortunately, too, he had acted so promptly in forming a Staff that he was able to leave the preliminary prosecution of peace activities in the safe keeping of those whom he had been accustomed to consult, as the President used to remark with respect to Secretary Daniels, "in intimate fashion."

There was, first of all, Doctor Sidney Edward Mezes, formerly, of course, of Texas but now of the College of the City of New York, and by chance his own brother-in-

law, drafted to serve at the expense in whole or in part of the city and known to *Who's Who* as "part author" of "The Conception of God." Then came Gordon Auchincloss, Esq., a lawyer of merit and distinction, who happens to be the Colonel's son-in-law; and next in line, according to the newspapers, Mr. Ignace Paderewski, the well-known piano tuner; and finally Mr. Richard Le Gallienne, the deft depicter of a "Maker of Rainbows" and "The Quest of the Golden Girl." At the last moment Mr. Auchincloss was transferred to the War branch of Colonel House's Department and sailed away, but the country may rest assured that there will be no abatement in the gathering of data under the skilful direction of his eminent colleagues.

The fitness of the War Staff selected by the President to accompany Colonel House must be considered in relation with the purposes and objects of the conference itself. Upon that point, we regret to remark, official definitions continue to be as contradictory as were the declarations, to which we alluded last month, of the State Department and the Assistant President with respect to the vocation of the Peace-Data commission. Secretary Lansing asserted with exceptional positiveness that "it cannot be too strongly emphasized that it is a war conference and nothing else," but simultaneously Colonel House announced to the British that he was there "as a political representative of the American Government," to be "consulted from time to time by the other members of the commission, although each of them, by the nature of his respective duties, is working independently of the others." Ignoring the Secretary's rather obvious attempt to dissociate the Colonel from the State Department and passing the Colonel's tacit disclaimer of eminent capacity as a military expert and turning to our Allies for accurate information, we find ourselves in confusion worse confounded. "We are on the eve now," said Mr. Lloyd George in announcing the arrangement, "of the most important international conference ever held, a military and political conference. Some of the greatest, some of the most prominent statesmen of all the Allied countries will be there, some of the most distinguished soldiers of the Allied countries. The decisions taken will affect the whole course of the war and may very well determine the ultimate issue." And yet, hardly a fortnight later, Mr. Bonar Law declared in the House of Commons that the conference

would be restricted absolutely to consideration of the military problem and would not even touch upon questions of a political nature. Whether this abrupt *volt-face* was due to a hint from Lord Northcliffe or Lord Reading to the effect that Colonel House would inevitably be named as the head of the American mission and that his appearance in that capacity, so soon after he had been charged, according to the European version, with prosecution of "peace activities," would surely enhance the perturbation caused among the Allies by his original appointment, is not perhaps a proper subject for speculation. The simple fact, however, that both Lord Northcliffe and Lord Reading were summoned three thousand miles from their important tasks in this country to participate in the conference clearly bore out the Premier's assertion that the gathering would be of the ablest minds, of the "most prominent statesmen" and doubtless of the "most distinguished soldiers," so far at least as Europe is concerned.

Two questions arise immediately (1) Whether the American mission measures up in this "most important international conference ever held" and (2) Whether it is the strongest in ability, experience and reputation that could have been sent. Both, we fear, must be answered in the negative, the first upon its face and the second no less assuredly upon examination. There is no question, for example, of the capacity of either General Bliss or Admiral Benson, but the fact remains that, both at home and abroad, as well as in the service, the superiority in a broad sense of General Wood and Admiral Fiske is universally recognized. It is not, indeed, too much to say that these two famous officers constitute, in their respective spheres, a class by themselves,—the former as a soldier of the highest order, broadest vision and extraordinary energy, and the latter, as a naval strategist, unsurpassed since Mahan and, as an inventor and developer of new methods such as have now become the crying need of the Allied navies, absolutely without a peer in the world. In age, the two Admirals are but a year apart and General Wood has the advantage of seven years over General Bliss, who incidentally reaches the period of retirement during the present month,—a circumstance greatly to be deplored if the United States is to have, as she should have, a representative on the new Board of General Control, with Generals Cadorna, Wilson and Foch.

While fully appreciating the apparent feeling of the President that only those who have won the personal regard of both himself and his Secretaries or who at least have not given offense by insisting too zealously, as undoubtedly both General Wood and Admiral Fiske did insist, upon preparedness, should be entrusted with high commands, we cannot escape the conclusion that, in this instance at any rate, the happening is most unfortunate and may easily prove to have been calamitous. Nevertheless, since, as we remarked in September, the enforced virtual abdication of Congress placed upon the President undivided responsibility for the conduct of the war, it is right and proper that he should use his own best judgment in making important assignments, and it is a gratifying circumstance that, however the relative merits of those mentioned may seem to balance, he evidenced his appreciation of the momentous character of the conference by retaining Rear Admiral Grayson on shore duty and naming as the representatives of the United States abroad the titular heads of the army and the navy.

So much, alas, cannot be said of the civilian members of the Board designated. Mr. Oscar T. Crosby, Mr. Bainbridge Colby, Dr. Alonzo Taylor and Mr. Thomas Nelson Perkins are gentlemen of excellent parts no doubt, but each is a subordinate in his respective Department and, as such, can hardly hope to wield influence comparable with that of "the greatest and most prominent statesmen of all the Allied nations." Of Mr. Vance McCormick and Mr. Gordon Auchincloss, as international or even national figures, only passing mention need be made, to complete the list.

The answer to our second query, *i. e.*, as to whether the delegation is the strongest "in ability, experience and reputation" that could have been named is only too obvious. Indeed, according to Mr. David Lawrence, of the *Evening Post*, the Administration itself was so conscious of its weakness that the State Department requested the Washington correspondents to refrain from speculating upon the probable *personnel* of the commission until it should have actually landed upon foreign soil, thereby "making impossible criticism which officials have repeatedly said they did not want to prevent." Whether or not this hardly credible supposition, implying nothing less than cheap political trickery upon the part of a Government pledged to frankness and

publicity, be correct or not, the effect necessarily is that indicated as having been designed, namely, to render comment both supererogatory and ineffective. We prefer greatly to believe that the real purpose was that announced,—to distract the attention of the Germans through secrecy and thus avert danger to the commissioners from especially venomous submarine attacks.

Far more to the point and far more disquieting are Mr. Lawrence's further assertions to the effect that the President's choosing of "only men who have been politically affiliated with him already has brought forth expressions of regret among many persons disposed to be friendly to the President, and who declare that in order to retain the confidence of all political parties the White House ought not fail at least to consult those of opposite political faith whose record inspires public confidence"; that he did not consult a single member of the Congressional committees whose co-operation will be essential to the fulfilment of any commitment made by the Mission; and that "the risk to the American people whose sons are fighting the war may prove to be incalculably greater if second-rate men are sent to represent the United States at the most important conference of the war."

But even this is understandable, in the light of the early prediction of Mr. C. W. Gilbert in the *Tribune* that "if Mr. Wilson does as he always does the man who will represent this country, probably as head of the permanent inter-Allied organization, will be merely the President's other self, and Mr. Wilson will be the most powerful man in the war, directly applying himself to its larger problems."

Here was an accurate forecast, of course, of Colonel House, not merely as the head of the Mission but, as a corollary of his prompt consignment in London of the other members to their "respective duties," as the whole delegation and alone and unaccompanied except, naturally, by his good lady, entitled to dine with George and Mary. Mr. David Lawrence will readily perceive, therefore, how idle was the original "confident expectation" in Washington that "on such an important mission, the President would not fail to send America's greatest statesmen, not only men of long diplomatic experience, but practical business men accustomed to deal in large affairs."

True, if the scope of the conference as defined by Mr.

Lloyd George be accepted in lieu of Mr. Lansing's rather pointed limitation, the country might have felt more adequately represented in statesmanship by Mr. Root of world-wide fame and still a member of the Hague Tribunal, or by Senator Lodge, a staunch adherent of the Administration's war measures; or in diplomacy, by Mr. Herrick, the most successful and popular ambassador we ever sent to France, or by David Jayne Hill, as well known in Europe as in America, or by Mr. John Bassett Moore, our recognized authority; in finance, by Mr. George F. Baker or by Mr. J. P. Morgan or by Mr. Thomas F. Ryan or by Mr. Otto H. Kahn; in business of great magnitude, by Mr. Henry C. Frick or by former Senator Winthrop Murray Crane or by Mr. Theodore N. Vail or by Mr. Clarence H. Mackay or by Judge Gary; in resuscitation, by Major General Henry P. Davison, head of the Red Cross, or better yet perhaps, for the effect abroad, by Major General William Howard Taft, and so on; but unfortunately these, with exception of Mr. Ryan and the possible exception of Mr. Kahn, are Republicans.

Mr. Gerard, however, the only diplomat of the Allies who has been in Germany since the war began, is a Democrat; and so is Mr. Alton B. Parker; and so are Judge Lovett and Mr. Frederick D. Underwood, experts in transportation; and so are the members of the Cabinet and a majority of both Houses of Congress. Surely Secretary Lane or Secretary Houston, the two members of the Cabinet who ought to have the most and seem to have the least to do with the prosecution of the war, would have carried more weight than the unknown assistant secretaries who were sent. And most potent of all beyond any question, in the light of his recent great successes, and as the holder of the purse strings and the distributor at will of billions among the Allied nations, would have been Secretary McAdoo.

But enough! We shall not discuss the unique and exclusive qualifications of Colonel House as contrasted with those of the galaxy of men suggested and of twice as many more who might be named. To do so until he shall have had full opportunity to prove himself by his works would be manifestly improper and perhaps not altogether polite, since we have just been reading his book. But the Colonel errs when he announces himself as "a political representative of the American Government." The Constitution makes

no provision for ambassadors and ministers whose appointments are not confirmed by the Senate. Colonel House is the personal representative of the head of one branch of the Government; "a friend of mine," as the President himself put it very neatly in his Buffalo speech; just that and, if we may take the liberty of applying Secretary Lansing's phrase, "nothing else."

For ourselves, we perceive no cause for criticism of the appointment of Colonel House, whom, as we have frequently remarked, we hold in high esteem as the wisest, if not the only, guide, counsellor and friend of the President. It is a departure, of course, from the custom of the early days when only statesmen of established reputations were dispatched upon like missions, as was illustrated most strikingly by John Adams when, in a similar crisis, he sent to France his most bitter political antagonist, John Marshall; but there were no cables in those days and an Ambassador was obliged to assume actual responsibility; now no such necessity exists. Nor to our mind does it matter that Colonel House is without experience as a legislator or as an executive in either public or private affairs; he has proved himself a shrewd observer and an accurate reporter; as such, we have no doubt he will render satisfactorily the only service required of him by the President.

The foreign method is different, to be sure. Both the French and Italians—the Japanese, too, for that matter—sent to us their best in both brains and fame; and the British! God bless us! Not since 1776 have so many distinguished Englishmen set foot upon American soil. The Lord Chief Tory led the way, only to be followed in quick succession by the Lord Chief Journalist and the Lord Chief Justice and the Lord Chief High Commissioner of Australia and the Lord Chief Prime Minister of New Zealand and the Lord alone knows how many more of lesser rank. In point of fact, it is no longer a secret that may not now be revealed with propriety that the Prime Minister was about to come when something happened in Italy to prevent; even so at this very writing he is somewhere or somewhere else in France. So it is not so surprising as at first thought it might seem that, a few months ago, the British War Council directed one of their representatives in this country to extend a formal invitation to the President to attend a general conference in London. In passing, it should be noted that the

particular Lord Chief who was charged with the performance of the delicate task did not submit the proposal; possibly he was aware that the Vice President was away at the time and that, though he should return, he was not wholly or even partly in accord with the President's method of conducting the war. Even so, if a serious tangle should arise in the great Paris conference, would it be so poor an idea, after all, for the President to go personally to Paris, as he goes to Congress, and straighten it out? Believe us, the task of personally directing the most stupendous warfare the world has ever known, three thousand miles from the scene of action, for a period of years, even with the aid of so excellent a transmitter as Colonel House, is not to be undertaken without grave misgivings; but, since there is nothing to do about it, we shall continue, without concluding, to hope for the best.

And the most heartening thing we have heard in a long time is that self-same Buffalo utterance of the President, wherein he skilfully rectified the widely advertised peace-activities foolishness of his friend by saying that, although Colonel House "is as great a lover of peace as I know, I did not send him on a peace mission; I sent him to take part in a conference as to how the war is to be won, and he knows, as I know, that that is the way to get peace, if you want it for more than a few minutes." That is what we have been waiting and longing to hear for eight weary months and we rejoice accordingly, because now we can see no possible escape from fighting for peace through victory alone. And there were other things in the speech, some of which naturally or perhaps from sheer contrariness we care little for; such, for example, as seeking tiresomely familiar "common counsel" when, of course, only didactic utterance was possible; as wishing to speak simply as a "fellow citizen" instead of "words of authority" as President, when everybody knows that no other words would have been heard or at least reported; as considering it "a real honor to be thus invited to your (labor's) public councils" because "I say that you are reasonable in a larger number of cases than the capitalists," something "I am not saying to them personally, because (alas!) I haven't had a chance"; and finally as declaring with startling frankness in flat contradiction of the Postmaster General "*I would like to see all the critics exported,*"—an illuminating expression which oddly enough did not appear in the authorized Associated Press report.

But, passing as immaterial such fol-de-rol, upon the easy assumption that an old ribbon of the New Freedom days crept back momentarily to the typewriter, we find the body of the Buffalo speech the best yet,—clear, strong and true. Its most gratifying feature, of course, in recollection of previous utterances, is the definite and irrevocable demand for peace through victory and victory alone, but hardly less satisfying and inspiring are these resolute words:

Our duty, if we are to do this great thing and show America to be what we believe her to be, the greatest hope and energy of the world—then must we stand together night and day until the job is finished.

If we are true friends of freedom—our own or anybody else's—we will see that the power of this country, and the productivity of this country, is raised to its absolute maximum and that absolutely nobody is allowed to stand in the way of it.

Spoken like a man, say we; like an American man; like an American President of whom we are glad to be proud. Now it remains only to make the words good—and quickly, quickly, quickly, for God's sake!

Since that night of peril to civilization, when Paris lay within range of German guns and the President of France, about to depart, with tears streaming down his face, consigned the treasures of the city to the care and protection of the sympathetic American ambassador, there has not been a time when the outlook was as black as it is today. Whatever way we turn our troubled eyes in search of omens of victory, we gaze upon a blank wall. True, the submarine menace seems to have diminished and, true, the great Western armies are gaining, inch by inch, ground whose possession may or may not be worth its cost in men and munitions; but these achievements, gratifying though they are, mark in a large sense no more than successful defense. Germany continues to be the irresistible aggressor; Germany continues to win; Germany has become exultant and has lifted the hearts of her allies; Germany is stronger than ever before; Germany no longer seeks peace.

And why should she?

Russia, distracted and incoherent, lies prone at her feet, to be had at will for the taking; Roumania is her granary, fed by the hands of cowering peasants; Italy is broken and, as we write, the Huns are beginning to swarm over her most fertile provinces with a fair prospect of absorbing all of the vast resources in fields, in factories and in mines between

Venice and Milan. We hear no more of the possibility of "starving Germany into submission" and, as to invaluable Alsace-Lorraine, "Come and take it," sneers the Kaiser.

How has all this come about almost overnight? Are the Germans, in fact, a race of supermen? Have they accomplished so much so quickly unaided? No, it was not possible. They have had help, enormous and essential help from the Allies,—from England, from France and, God forgive us, from America.

Lloyd George tells the shocking story. Speaking in Paris, upon his return from Italy, of the decision to create a unified directive or advisory military body, he declared that, since the Italian disaster necessitated action without delay, "unfortunately we did not have time to consult the United States or Russia before creating this council." Diplomatic reasons may have warranted the linking together and putting upon the same plane a State in anarchy and a Nation possessing a stable government. It is easy, moreover, to appreciate the difficulty of consulting Russia when there was nobody to consult. But why the United States? Are not the cables at the service of the Governments? Have we no ambassador in France or England or Italy authorized to confer with the Government to which he is assigned or capable of transmitting a message to Washington and delivering a response? What impelled Messrs. Lloyd George and Painlevé to put this obvious slight, implying both incompetency and unauthorization, upon ambassadors duly appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate of the United States? Where did they get the impression that the only medium of communication with, and acceptable to, the American Government is an unofficial personal representative of the President accustomed to make only sporadic visits?

But let Mr. Lloyd George continue.

The Allies had committed a great fault, he said, in not assisting Serbia adequately in holding her line. The result was that the Central Empires broke the blockade and procured men and supplies from the East, without which Germany would have been unable to maintain the force of her armies.

"Why was this unbelievable fault committed?" asked the Premier. "The reply is simple. It was because no one in particular was charged with guarding the Balkan gate.

The united front had not become a reality. France and England were absorbed by other problems in other regions. Italy thought only of the Carso. Russia was mounting guard over a frontier of a thousand miles, and, even without that, she could not have passed through to have helped Serbia, because Roumania was neutral.

"It is true that we sent troops to Salonika to succor Serbia, but, as always, they were sent too late. Half the men who fell in the vain effort to pierce the Western front in September that same year would have saved Serbia, saved the Balkans and completed the blockade of Germany.

"You may say this is an old story. I grant you that it was simply the first chapter of a series that has continued to the present hour; 1915 was the year of the Serbian tragedy; 1916 was the year of the Roumanian tragedy, which was a repetition of the Serbian story almost without change. This is unbelievable, when you think of the consequences to the Allies' cause of the Roumanian defeat. Opulent wheatfields and rich petroleum wells passed to the enemy and Germany was able to escape us.

"Through the harvest of 1917 the siege of the Central Powers was raised once more, and the horrible war was once more prolonged. That would not have happened, had there existed some central authority, charged with meditating upon the problem of the war for the entire theater of the war."

All this is true enough and sad enough, but it stopped short at the crucial point. Mr. Lloyd George might speak safely as well as shrewdly with what he termed "frankness that is perhaps brutal" of blunders committed for which, although at the time a member of the War Council, he could not be held personally responsible, but what of the latest and greatest of all,—the refusal or failure of England to extend aid to Italy, in the time of her greatest need, while he himself was Premier with full authority? As to that, according to the published reports, "after reviewing the Italian campaign," he calmly observed that, so far as he was concerned, he had "arrived at the conclusion that if nothing was changed," he "could no longer accept the responsibility for the direction of a war condemned to disaster from lack of unity." If this was not political camouflage, corresponding to cuttlefish tactics with which we ourselves are not wholly unfamiliar, then whatever powers of intui-

tion and deduction we may have possessed have been lost irretrievably.

The plain fact, if we, too, may speak with "frankness that is perhaps brutal"—as it is high time somebody did—is that both England and France, selfishly, wantonly and foolishly, left Italy in the lurch at the critical moment and, largely at the instance and under the influence of the British representatives in this country, America did likewise. Lieutenant Bruno Roselli of the Eighty-third Infantry, Venice Brigade, told the plain truth when, on November 13, he spoke, as a soldier should speak, frankly and bravely to an American audience, these words:

Three months ago Italy told America of her needs in coal and steel. Italy told the Allies that the way was open for the advance into Austria which would break the backbone of Austria and cut Germany off from giving any help to the Balkans and to Turkey. But America is not at war with Austria. There was delay. We Italians have tried that game of fighting one of the enemy. We fought Austria, refusing to declare war on Germany until we found German soldiers in Austrian uniforms, carrying the German soldier war books which recited that they had volunteered in the Austrian army. And while we fought Austria German spies lived upon us. That lesson must be taken to heart in America, for there are spies from Germany's allies here.

Promises were made by America of supplies, but it was necessary, it was said, to send troops abroad. And those men were anxious to fight. I know, because I have seen them. The promises could not be fulfilled, and in the time of delay Germany struck. Three months were lost in this country deciding whether steel or wooden ships should be built. And in the meantime Italy's warning went unheeded, and today we face a situation which will cost many American lives to repair.

This last victory of Germany's means that the decisive battle must come on the Franco-Flanders front. But three months ago the time was ripe for the Italians to go forward and break the Austro-German empire in two. Italy has paid for the mistake in the loss of 200,000 of my compatriots. If the Allies will learn the lesson of co-operation their loss will not be in vain.

Whether, indeed, the Allies will learn their lesson and this frightful loss will not have been in vain Heaven alone knows; if the record of criminal blundering as cited by Mr. Lloyd George with respect to all except his own delinquencies affords a true criterion, the contrary will surely eventuate; but the heartbreaking statements of this outspoken officer we know, from the lips of members of the Italian mission, to be facts; and so do the authorities in Washington.

How did this awful mistake happen? Why was assistance denied to Italy in time to save not only herself but, as Lieutenant Roselli truly says, the "many American lives" that must pay the penalty? We could have done it easily. Despite all exculpatory assertions to the contrary, we had the coal and the steel and the ships. And we had the money, of course; else how could we have placed, as we did place with a great flourish, a great sum to the credit of Italy on the very day after the disaster took place, but alas, in the words of Lloyd George, "too late, always too late."

Money? Heavens above! More than three billions of dollars have been parcelled out to the various Allies. By whom? By the Secretary of the Treasury, who has no more to do with the war than we have and probably knows less about it, who is not even a member of the wonderful Council of National Defense, who has had to do the work of ten men—and has done it admirably—in raising these colossal sums. We pass no criticism upon his distribution; we do not question for a moment that he has made it carefully upon such information as he had; but what could he know of the crying need, let us say, of poor Italy and how could he ascertain her requirements while travelling from Maine to Oregon selling bonds?

But, we hear someone say, the President has to approve the Secretary's recommendations and he, of course, knows. Well, maybe so. But when, as Mr. Mark Sullivan records in *Collier's*, the detailed prosecution of the war has reached a point where the request of soldiers in a Southern camp for sweet potatoes in place of Irish could not be answered till it had been "put up to the President," one might, we should say, be pardoned for suspecting a certain degree of superficiality. In any case, we cannot escape the conclusion that, if the situation in Italy had been carefully studied by a competent War Council and the findings of that Council had been placed before the President in the form of a recommendation, this dreadful calamity might have been averted.

We assume that, before these words appear in print, the Supreme War Council will have been established at Versailles in substantial conformity with the plan proposed by the British Premier. That it is a step in the right direction there can be no doubt. Germany's military superiority lies

in single control and direction as against the scattered efforts and aims of the Allies. Whatever tends to unify the forces fighting the great battle of civilization cannot fail to be helpful and we are convinced that, in time, despite the confusion which will ensue at first from inevitable conflicts of authority between the civilian Council, with its own military advisers, and the various General Staffs and the field officers, continuing experience will find a way. Unless all history is at fault, the appointment of a Generalissimo would seem to afford the true solution, but even though the existing national prejudices and individual jealousies could be overcome, the man is not in sight and is not likely to appear after more than three years from among the war-worn officers now in command. America, free from entanglements, seeking no aggrandizement or territorial advantages and the real master of the situation if she should see fit to exercise her obvious prerogative, may yet produce the leader so sadly needed. If so, God speed the day!

Clearly, however, the hope of such a development lies far in the future. At present, it is quite evident, our Allies, while deeply appreciative of the value of the United States as an aid, have no thought of recognizing her as an equal in shaping general policy. True, Mr. Bonar Law expressed a casual "hope" that this Nation would participate in the deliberations of the Supreme Council, but he did so perfunctorily, if not somewhat grudgingly, and the fact that our Government is not expected to take a prominent part is indicated by the circumstance noted above, that it was not even consulted, and by the provision in the first article that the Council should be "composed of the Prime Minister"—a title and position unknown to the United States—"and a member of each Government." We do not mean to intimate that this restriction was designed to exclude our Government; indeed, we do not doubt that even a private citizen personally representing the President would be deemed acceptable; we mention the matter only to show that the attitude and possible wishes of the United States were not even considered or probably thought of.

There appears, moreover, no sign that our own Government has formed an opinion with respect to the extent of the participation which it may desire or consider proper. For some reason, inexplicable to most of us and frankly distasteful to Lord Northcliffe's London *Times*, the Administration

scrupulously refers to our Allies as "co-belligerents" and has not even paid them the courtesy of returning the visits of their distinguished missions. In fact, so far as we can make out, it cannot quite make up its mind whether it is wholly in or partly in or only looking on and biding events. We take for granted that the President has formulated within himself some policy which he considers would better be kept from the public for the present. What it may be we would not venture to surmise, but surely he must realize that the American people are not going to be satisfied to hazard millions of lives and expend billions and billions of money in an indefinitely prolonged war without having something effective to say about how that war is waged, especially in view of the way it has been botched for forty months. And if, as indicated by the Buffalo speech, the decision has finally been reached to go in for all we are worth to a finish, something must be done soon to obtain our directive rights or we may awake presently to realization that we are as much too late as we were in extending aid to Italy.

The whole difficulty, we fear, is to be found in the secret hope, even anticipation, both in Washington and in London that when this country, with its "boundless resources," should have been in the war long enough to make a tremendous showing by way of preparation, Germany would "crumple" and the war would come to an end. We frankly doubt if either the Secretary of War or the Secretary of the Navy has really believed until quite recently, or perhaps believes even now, that this country would ever actually have an army of millions fighting in Europe. That the same illusion has possessed the Secretary of State and the Secretary of the Interior we cannot even suspect; their sense and breadth would not permit; but the inherent pacifist is invariably a confirmed optimist; at this moment, in fact, unless public utterances convey wholly false symptoms, Mr. Daniels is far more concerned with his war on rum and gonorrhea than by the war of the United States on Germany.

To guess at the working of the President's own mental processes during this trying period would be to speculate idly because whatever may have been indicated by his appointment of his friend as an arranger of peace has been swept away by his reappointment of him as a wager of war. So now it seems safe to assume that at last, whether the President is leading the people or, as Mr. Roosevelt sug-

gests, the people are leading the President, we have reached a firm foundation, from which to pursue a definite purpose. But the attainment is none the less easy; indeed, when we consider that it costs us fourteen times as much as it costs Germany to keep an equal number of soldiers on the firing line and that the maintenance of every one requires the continuous labor of four men at home, the undertaking seems even greater than we had supposed.

Nevertheless, it can be done if we first find and then retain a true perspective. So far, we have only been leaping grandly into the dark; now the time has come when we should proceed more sagaciously, more soberly and more prudently, in the light of events which have evolved a recognizable situation. Every step and every act, from this day forward, beginning with the reassembling of Congress, should be taken with a view to prosecuting a mighty war for at least five years. Accept that as a basis of calculation, reckoning all proposals with respect to finance, manufacture, transportation, aeroplanes, ships, munitions and men accordingly, and our whole scheme of preparation for ultimate but certain triumph will be revised necessarily and at once.

It does not suffice to say glibly that Germany can never win against the whole world; she has won up to date against a preponderant portion of the whole world and is still winning; what we have to do is not merely to prevent her from continuing her devastations but to win back what she has won—and more. It is, as we have said, not an easy task, nothing like as easy as it would have been a year or six months ago; since Russia has gone mad and Italy has bitten the dust, the magnitude of the essential undertaking has increased fourfold. And that is why we say that this is the darkest moment since the battle of the Marne.

But we do not despair; we are not even dismayed. Our mental gaze cannot pierce the cloud but our moral vision tells us that its lining is of silver; it must be; and we shall find it, never fear! Are we losing the war? No. But we are not winning it—and we have far, very far, to go.

DAMN THE TORPEDOES!

FULL SPEED AHEAD!

"Damn the torpedoes! Full speed ahead!"

That was the order of the day one August morning in 1864, and the result was victory. That must be the order of the day at this time, if we are to win victory

That is, above all else, the lesson of Italy's disaster and of Russia's debacle. The instant comment upon those sickening tragedies was that if we had been more prompt in providing munitions of war, they would never have occurred.

It ought, indeed, to have been obvious and axiomatic to everybody, the moment that we righteously decided to accept Germany's insolent challenge to war, that our duty and our only rational course was to cry "Full speed ahead!" and then go to it. There were many who saw it, and said it, and did it so far as they could. But oh, the inertia and the indifference of the mass! And oh, the sophistry and folly of those who counselled a waiting policy!

The crowning folly, however, and the crowning disloyalty, would be still to persist in that fatuous course of expectancy and delay, after the tragic object-lessons which it has brought before us. Every moment of delay should be a thousand-fold convincing argument and appeal now, at last, to go "Full speed ahead!"

And "damn the torpedoes!"

By torpedoes we mean all obstacles, real or imaginary, that are in the way. The spirit of hesitancy, the passion of greed, the pride of opinion, and what not else—away with them all! The Republic is in peril; and "the safety of the Republic is the supreme law." Everything—we use the word in its most sweeping sense—everything must be subordinated to the one supreme need of winning this war; for if we do not win the war, we shall lose everything else.

The war is not ended yet. It cannot be ended until the Hun is crushed, and the Hun is not crushed yet. Of that fact the Russian and Italian cataclysms are only too painful reminders. We have not killed the snake. We have not even scotched it. We are not yet safe from the lethal venom of its fangs. The need of the hour is that we shall slay the creature, dead, dead, dead. We must, or it will slay us.

That is why we are called upon to make haste, to the very utmost of our ability.

Our Allies are sorely stricken and distressed. Make haste to succor them before they fail. Our enemy is rampant and exultant. Make haste to strike him down before he increases his strength. Our own Republic is menaced by the possibility—it is still a possibility—of a Hunnish triumph.

“Damn the torpedoes! Full speed ahead!”

THE JAPANESE AGREEMENT

“THE bearings of this observation,” quoth the Ancient Sage, “lays in the application on it;” a sapient and lucid explanation which might with much pertinence be made concerning the “gentlemen’s agreement” which has just been concluded between the United States and Japan concerning their respective rights in China and the future status of that country.

We find, for example, among some of what Rufus Choate called “glittering and resounding generalities” about the Open Door, Equality of Opportunity, Independence, and Territorial Integrity, the following:

The Governments of the United States and Japan recognize that territorial propinquity creates special relations between countries, and, consequently, the Government of the United States recognizes that Japan has special interests in China, particularly in the part to which her possessions are contiguous. . . . The Government of the United States has every confidence in the repeated assurances of the Imperial Japanese Government that, while geographical position gives Japan such special interests, they have no desire to discriminate against the trade of other nations or to disregard the commercial rights heretofore granted by China in treaties with other Powers.

We are quite willing to accept as axiomatic the general proposition that territorial propinquity creates special relations between countries, but we are by no means ready to concede that therefore Japan has special interests in China if by that stock phrase we are to understand interests different from and superior to those of other nations. For Japan’s territorial propinquity to China is by no means unique. The contiguity of her possessions with China is neither unique nor of nearly as long standing as that of the territories of other Powers.

The only Japanese territory which abuts upon China is Corea, which has belonged to Japan for only a little more than seven years. Great Britain, France and Russia have important territories abutting upon China along much more extended boundaries, which have belonged to them for much longer periods of time. It is therefore certainly pertinent to inquire whether they also are to be recognized as having, on grounds of territorial propinquity and contiguity, "special interests in China." If they have not, why not, if Japan is thus to be recognized? If they have, how do their special interests compare with those of Japan?

If we go beyond actual contiguity, and consider mere proximity, the same questions are raised in even more acute form. Our great American island of Luzon lies much nearer to the Chinese coast than does Japan itself, and scarcely further from the nearest important Chinese port, Canton, than does the nearest Japanese island, Formosa. In fact the Philippines have a propinquity to China differing only a little in degree and not at all in kind from that which Japan and her insular possessions have. If the propinquity of the latter is a basis for special interests, what becomes of that of the former?

We must in candor and friendship declare that upon the face of the case at least four other Powers; to wit, America, Great Britain, France and Russia, appear to have upon the ground of geographical position a title to special interests in China similar to that which is claimed by Japan and which Mr. Lansing's amiable note concedes to that Power; and we cannot help thinking that this "gentlemen's agreement" would have been stronger and would have given a surer guarantee of satisfactory permanence if it had in any way taken cognizance of that circumstance.

Again, the United States is made to express confidence that Japan has no desire "to disregard the commercial rights *heretofore* granted by China in treaties with other Powers." The italics are our own, and they call attention to the nub of the matter. Why, we are impelled to wonder, was that word "*heretofore*" inserted in Mr. Lansing's note? Has it any significance, as discriminating between treaties already made and those which may hereafter be made or be sought to be made? If it has no such significance, it is quite superfluous. Indeed, it is worse than superfluous, for it logically suggests a false idea. On the other hand, if it has such sig-

nificance, the way is opened for endless trouble; for we shall be tacitly recognizing Japan's right to supervise all future treaties which are made between the United States and China, and to intervene at will against the granting therein of commercial rights and concessions to this country, a state of affairs which could scarcely prove satisfactory.

These questions are not disposed of by the repeated and resounding assurances that "the territorial sovereignty of China remains unimpaired" and that both America and Japan "always adhere to the principle of the so-called 'open door' or equal opportunity for commerce and industry in China." Neither are they satisfactorily met by the declaration that both America and Japan are "opposed to the acquisition by any Government of any special rights or privileges that would affect the independence or territorial integrity of China, or that would deny to the subjects or citizens of any country the full enjoyment of equal opportunity in the commerce and industry of China." This latter declaration is in itself eminently satisfactory. But how does it harmonize with that concession of "special interests"? We are in effect told that Japan has special interests in China which do not affect the independence or territorial integrity of that country, and which do not interfere with our enjoyment of equal opportunity with Japan herself in the commerce and industry of China. What, then, it will be asked, are those special interests? What is their scope? What do they affect, and effect? Of what value are they to Japan?

This agreement has been widely characterized as establishing a Monroe Doctrine for the Far East; suggesting, of course, that Japan is proclaiming such a doctrine in behalf of China, as we proclaimed it in behalf of Central and South America. In that view it will be pertinent to observe what "special interests" Japan should have in China, according to the analogy of our "special interests" in our American neighbors. As a matter of fact, there are none; or at any rate there are none beyond the limits already prescribed in the "open door" agreement of ten years ago. The United States does not claim and has never claimed any "special interests" in Latin America beyond the maintenance of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of those countries and the maintenance in them of the open door, or equality of opportunity in commerce and industry.

If there appear to be an exception to this rule in the sole

case of the Isthmian Canal, the answer is ready and obvious. Our original transit concession was acquired as a complement to a guarantee of sovereignty and integrity, and our objection to the acquisition of such a concession by any other Power was based not upon any pretension of "special interests" but upon the infringement of sovereignty and integrity which it would involve. As a matter of fact, we never effectively opposed even such a concession, which was granted again and again to more than one foreign Power, and we are at this very moment cordially acquiescing in the existence of a great British railroad across the Mexican isthmus, in rivalry with our own canal at Panama.

All we have insisted upon is that independence, sovereignty, integrity and the open door shall be maintained. Beyond that, no consideration nor circumstance of territorial propinquity, geographical position, or contiguity, has so much as suggested anything resembling "special interests" which might not freely and equally be claimed and possessed by the whole world. If in that sense a "Monroe Doctrine for the Far East" is being applied to China, well and good. But in that case, why these references to "special interests" and to the maintenance of treaty rights "heretofore" granted?

BARNARD'S LINCOLN

[THE frontispiece of this number is an unsatisfying representation of George Gray Barnard's statue of Lincoln which has been sent, as a gift to the British Empire, to be set up in London. In consideration of the savage criticisms of what, as a layman, we regard as a masterpiece, largely manufactured in consequence of the expressed disapproval of Mr. Robert T. Lincoln, we sought and present herewith excerpts from the expert judgments of Mr. Frederick Mac Monnies, sculptor, Mr. Thomas Hastings, architect, and Mr. Richard Fletcher, art critic.—EDITOR.]

BY FREDERICK MAC MONNIES

IN response to Colonel Harvey's request to write my view of Barnard's Lincoln, I feel called upon to say before doing so that I consider a nation-wide organized attack upon the serious work of any intellectual—whether scientist, musician, or artist—with the object of preventing its being carried out, is a dangerous precedent. Constructive criticism, based on logic, seasoned with sympathetic imagination, tempered with moderation, analyzing, illuminating,—never presuming to pass a final verdict, is wholesome. Destructive

criticism, outgrowth of ignorance and prejudice, condemning wholesale and aiming at complete annihilation, stifles personal research and all true artistic impulse. The attempt to harness initiative to the push-cart of dullness is to hamstring the Pegasus of human ingenuity and genius, and limit personal vision to a uniform standard. Of all stagnations, standardization is the most sodden.

If standardization had obtained in 1889 the "hideous blot" upon the fair Paris Exposition—Eiffel's Tower, prototype in steel construction and inspiration of our masterly skyscrapers—would have been relegated to some office file and progress retarded. The Darwins, Whistlers, Marconis, and Monets would have been cast into outer darkness and their works permanently "skied" had their critics been listened to. As I told my friend Barnard: had his statue been the work of an unknown artist and had it seemed to me hopelessly bad, my defense of it against a barbarous boycott would be identical. I believe in liberty of action and freedom of expression, in speech, in sculpture, in everything. I could envy the man who had the courage of his opinion to shed encumbrances and live in an ash-barrel. Every great thinker and craftsman freed himself from conventional formulas—from Galileo to Michael Angelo, and from Michael Angelo to Edison—or they would have accomplished nothing.

An eminent painter, writer and critic recently said that Barnard had failed because his vision of Lincoln was not the vision of the rest of us.

"It is easy to see what Barnard was trying to do, and why," Mr. Cox said. "He was carrying out in his sculpture his ideal of Lincoln. Of course, no artist can make a portrait of the 'real Lincoln.' Lincoln is dead; and in any case all that the artist can do is to carry out his ideal. Barnard's was, as he himself has said, the democratic ideal. He wished to represent Lincoln, the man of the people. And to do that he accentuated all that was rough and grotesque in his figure and bearing. Barnard has, indeed, done for Lincoln something of what Rembrandt did in his figures of Christ. In representing the Man of Sorrows, the Christ of the people, he made a figure that was often ugly and grotesque. Barnard's ideal is entirely comprehensible.

"But where I join issue is with Mac Monnies's statement that the fact that Barnard has carried out his ideal is a sufficient answer to criticism. I do not think it is. I think the question is whether Barnard's ideal is our ideal, and whether a statue of Lincoln that is to represent this country abroad should not more truly speak our thought than Barnard's expression of his ideal does. Also there is the question whether Barnard's ideal is a sculpturesque ideal—should it be done in sculpture?"

If Mr. Cox had lived in the sixteenth century, would he, in order to standardize vision and consequently to conform art to uniformity, prefer to tame the restless spirit of Michael Angelo and compel the groaning muscles of his statues into the elegant slenderness of a Jean Goujon, or would he build up weight and strength on one side and counsel banting on the other? Would he have permitted Rembrandt's "ugly and grotesque" figures of Christ at all?

Mr. Barnard has given his vision of Lincoln; personal, human, absolutely sincere; doubly interesting, as presenting another point of view than the majestic Lincoln of St. Gaudens. A distinguished committee has decided to present the statue abroad, as it conveys their idea of Lincoln, and they have a perfect right to do so, even if other American citizens, equally distinguished, prefer another statue.

BY THOMAS HASTINGS

YOU ask me to express my feeling as regards the Barnard statue of Lincoln.

I have the highest personal regard for the artistic ability of Mr. George Gray Barnard. While no artist who rises above mediocrity is always equally good in his work, there must always be something there to command the respect of the public and of his confreres. Realizing, as a working architect, how often the layman errs in his judgment upon architecture,—even when an artist other than an architect,—I hesitate to put myself in the same position, not being a sculptor.

However, I have always contended that all printed controversies and published adverse criticisms of works of art have done more harm for art in recent times than all other things put together. While a healthy discussion has existed since prehistoric times and is generally natural and wholesome, cheap print with the accompanying undeserved authority is of recent origin, and the kind of discussion which has recently been indulged in is only another example to establish a harmful precedent.

There are two ways of looking upon the statue,—first the question of propriety, which is one for the Commission itself to determine; and then the question of art, which would seem to determine itself because of the Commission being in such good hands.

I must confess that the photographs which I have seen of

Mr. Barnard's Lincoln were cruelly distorted,—as is so often the case with photographic reproductions,—and gave me a completely erroneous impression of his work, which I discovered when I recently saw the original in bronze. In seeing the figure, however, as far as the question of propriety is concerned, I was much relieved, and think that it has been grossly misrepresented and caricatured. No one should judge of it without seeing the original.

BY RICHARD FLETCHER

Standing in the presence of the Barnard Lincoln in the studio in a grim foundry, one is silenced and dumbstruck.

But, for him who will not wing to the boundless spaces of the artist's ether, there is everything one expects in Lincoln. The beardless chin gives us the indomitable will, the invincible firmness. The eyes and brows are aglow with benevolence and pity. The large hands folded across his torso (the target for the casual critic) express the innate modesty of the man, the self-forgetfulness which is the model for all of us. Squarely planted feet, large and unalluringly shod, reinforce the magnificence of strength, the uncompromising courage. The clothes, the clothes about which one hears such comment—who can think of clothes at a moment of deep appreciation for the qualities of character? From the technical point of view one hears nothing. What querulous voice has spoken of the softness, the sympathy, which enshroud the surface of the bronze?

Impressions growing into thoughts subdue one into a sitting posture on a wooden bench as the massive figure towers above the sentient man. The first impression is that it does not look like Lincoln—but it is Lincoln. Scrutiny confirms this belief, as the Presidency—even the history of the man—is subsidiary to the man himself. Falling beneath the spell of Barnard's miracle in bronze, one feels that the sculptor has wrought more wonderfully than even in investing the statue with the idealism and the faith and strength of this Friend of Man. He has interpreted the spirit of the War of the Rebellion—that school room of our national education. Barnard has virtually translated an epoch into a figure in metal.

[We have only to add that, having actually seen this extraordinary creation, unlike Mr. Robert T. Lincoln and others who have condemned it, we concur unqualifiedly in these judgments.—EDITOR.]